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Abstract 
Saving brings an economic loss. The author intends to publish a paper, 
which gives a foundation of this paradox of thrift by connecting money 
circulation analysis and welfare economics in the case where saving is 
limited to hoarding. As an introduction of the intended paper, this paper 
provides a simple explanation for hoarding loss using some graphs. 
Under certain conditions, the representative agent hoards money in order 
to increase utility, but the hoarding actually decreases it against agent’s 
rational intention. This irrationality of rationality occurs because the agent 
maximizes their utility while lowering the budget of the entire relevant term. 
This conclusion is derived from the agent making the decision with an 
ignorance of the whole expenditure reflux. Since the interest of a selfish 
agent is limited to their private range, the agent ignores the objective truth. 
 
Keywords: Money Circulation, Welfare Economics, Under-Consumption, 
Paradox of Thrift, Intertemporal Choice. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Saving brings an economic loss even though it is often regarded as a virtue. 
This proposition, known as the paradox of thrift, is one of main elements of 
the under-consumption theory.1 
Before the Second World War, studies to understand the causes of 
under-consumption while connecting it with the money circulation structure 
were performed by some economists including Nicholas August Ludwig 
Jacob Johannsen, 2  the pair of William Trufant Foster and Waddill 
Catchings,3 and two German economists, Ferdinand Grünig and Carl Föhl.4 
                                                   
1 Cf. Haberler [1964] pp.118-141, Klein [1966] pp.124-152, Nash & Gramm [1969], 
Bleaney [1976], Dimand [1990], Allgoewer [2002], Clark [2008], Schneider [2008] for a 
history of the under-consumption theory. 
2 Cf. Hegeland [1954] pp.5-14, Schneider [1962] pp.131-134, Marget [1964] pp.329-336, 
Allsbrock [1986], Hagemann & Rühl [1990], Rühl [2000]. 
3 Cf. Gleason [1959], Carlson [1962], Tavlas [1976], Dimand [2008a], Dimand [2008b]. 
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We support such attempts, but they lack a clear evaluation criterion even 
though under-consumption is an ethical problem of economic society. A clear 
ethical standard should be introduced to evaluate it. Here, we adopt an 
evaluation criterion based on individual utility, imitating the new welfare 
economics after Vilfredo Pareto. 
  New welfare economics has usually been connected with the general 
equilibrium theory. This connection derives the first fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics, which insists that a market economy is realized as a 
Pareto efficient state.5 We should not neglect a critique against the general 
equilibrium theory. 
  The dual decision hypothesis by Robert Wayne Clower is remarkable as 
one such critique.6 It suggests that realized revenue used in expenditure 
optimization should not be regarded as being decided by the level of 
commodity supply. Although this is a valid critique of the general 
equilibrium theory, its weak point is that it does not clarify the decision 
principle of the realized revenue in lieu of commodity supply. 
  In a monetary economy, realized revenue is decided by money flow from 
expenditure, whereas expenditure is affected by money flow from revenue 
through a decision-making process under budget constraints. Therefore, the 
money circulation structure is composed of these bidirectional flows between 
expenditure and revenue. We ought to construct a theory of expenditure 
optimization in which bidirectional money flow is reflected. This is the 
money circulation optimization theory. 
  The author intends to publish a paper, which shows the welfare economic 
foundation of the paradox of thrift using the money circulation optimization 
in the case where saving is limited to hoarding. This paper provides a simple 
explanation for hoarding loss using some graphs. We hope this simple 
explanation promotes understanding of the intended paper. 
 
  
2. Budget Constraint of a Monetary Economy 
 
We first make an assumption of this paper clear. In reality, there are many 
economic agents. However, in order to simplify the explanation, this paper 
supposes that there exists only a single individual agent in the relevant 
society. This supposition of the so-called representative agent has a risk, 
which could cause a misunderstanding of the following description. We will 
                                                                                                                                                     
The author owes knowledge regarding Foster and Catchings largely to Sasahara [1981], 
written in Japanese. 
4 Cf. Pedersen [1954], Pedersen [1957], Schneider [1962] pp.156-159, Rothschild [1964] 
pp.8-11, Ambrosi [1996]. The author owes knowledge regarding Föhl largely to Ito 
[1952], and Nagasawa [1968] written in Japanese. 
5 Cf. Arrow [1951], Debreu [1959] pp.90-97, Stiglitz [1991], Blaug [2007], Feldman 
[2008]. 
6 Cf. Clower [1965]. 
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explain this risk later.  
  In this paper, we discuss a primitive monetary economy. This primitive 
economy is not a faithful description of our current monetary economy, but 
the working of a more realistic monetary economy is too complicated to 
understand. Hence, we think that the assumption of a primitive economy is 
an appropriate primary approach. 
  One assumption of the primitive economy is that money is neither 
produced nor disappears in the relevant space-time, which refers to the 
sphere which satisfies both the relevant society and the relevant term. In 
addition, it is assumed that money is not transferred between the relevant 
society and its outside. 
  A problem of the general equilibrium theory is mainly caused by the 
budget constraint used in the theory. We must use an appropriate budget 
constraint of a monetary economy in which time irreversible disposal is 
considered. 
  We define expenditure as transferring money to the relevant space-time, 
and revenue as money being transferred from the relevant space-time. 
Agents in a monetary economy can expend money they receive, but we must 
note that revenue can be expended only time irreversibly. In other words, 
money cannot be disposed as expenditure before or exactly at the time it is 
received. We call this the disposal irreversibility principle. 
  Based on this principle, if the relevant term is divided into infinitesimally 
short terms, the revenue of each divided short term cannot be expended in 
the same term. We call such a short term a basic-term. For the sake of 
simplicity, this paper assumes that the relevant term consists of only two 
basic-terms. 
  Hoarding is defined as money which is expendable but is not expended in a 
basic-term. Note that non-expendable money in a basic-term is not called 
hoarding even if it exists in the basic-term. Accordingly, revenue in a 
basic-term does not become hoarding in the same term because it is not 
expendable within the term based on the definition of the basic-term. 
  In order to connect expenditure optimization with money circulation 
analysis, it is indispensable to construct budget constraints in keeping with 
the disposal irreversible principle. The budget constraint used in this paper 
is a special case of the irreversibility budget constraint reported in Miura 
[2015b].7 We will explain a reason of this indispensability of the irreversible 
principle later. 
  As it is assumed that money does not disappear and is not transferred to 
the outside, the budget is either being expended or being hoarded. Therefore, 
Xt+Ht=Bt holds where Bt refers to the budget of Basic-term t, Xt refers to 
expenditure in Basic-term t, and Ht refers to hoarding in Basic-term t. This 
                                                   
7 The idea of the irreversibility budget constraint was primitively suggested by Dennis 
Holme Robertson, and was developed by Sho Chieh Tsiang and others. Cf. Robertson 
[1933], Keynes & Hawtrey & Robertson [1933], Metzler [1948], Tsiang [1966], Kohn 
[1981], Kohn [1988], Laidler [1989], Van Eeghen [2014]. 
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formula is the basis of the budget constraint of Basic-term t. 
  Next, we consider the background of the budget. Due to the definition of 
the basic-term, a candidate of the budget in a basic-term is limited to the 
money available at the beginning of the basic-term. Therefore, B1=Ψ holds 
where Ψ refers to money possessed at the beginning of the relevant term. 
Since we assume that money is not produced or transferred from the outside, 
Ψ also represents the money stock in the relevant space-time. Eventually, 
the budget constraint of the first basic-term is X1+H1=Ψ. 
  Money expended in the first basic-term (X1) is lost, but money hoarded in 
the first basic-term (H1) is still available at the beginning of the second 
basic-term. Therefore, the latter becomes an element of the budget in the 
second basic-term (B2). Moreover, due to the definition of the basic-term, the 
revenue of the first basic-term cannot be disposed in the same term and is 
retained entirely at the beginning of the second basic-term. Therefore, the 
revenue also becomes an element of the budget. Candidates of B2 are limited 
to these hoarding and revenue because we assume that money is neither 
produced nor transferred from the outside. Let Yt be revenue of Basic-term t. 
From the above, we can derive B2=H1+Y1. Eventually, the budget constraint 
of the second basic-term is given by X2+H2=H1+Y1. 
  Hereby, the budget constraints of each basic-term have been determined. 
We will also clarify how money possessed at the end of the relevant term is 
decided. Whereas expended money of the second basic-term (X2) is lost by the 
agent, hoarded money of the second basic-term (H2) is still possessed at the 
end of the term. Furthermore, the revenue from the second basic-term (Y2) 
adds to the term-end possession. Hence, if we let Ω be the quantity possessed 
at the end of the relevant term, Ω=H2+Y2 holds. We call this the term-end 
settlement formula. 
  The set of these budget constraints of the two basic-terms and the 
settlement formula taken together is the irreversibility budget constraint. 
However, it is not perfect as a monetary budget constraint of society as a 
whole because it reflects only the money flow from revenue to expenditure. 
In order to express money circulation completely, the money flow from 
expenditure to revenue must also be considered. Such a consideration is 
indeed the essence of our money circulation optimization. 
  Note that someone must receive money expended by another. Therefore, 
the quantity of expenditure and that of revenue are always equal in the 
whole society. That is, Xt=Yt holds for any Basic-term t. We call this the law 
of transfer equality. This law also expresses that expenditure of the whole 
society refluxes to its own revenue. In other words, the law of transfer 
equality is a quantitative expression of the whole expenditure reflux, which 
represents the money flow from expenditure to revenue in the whole society.8 
By incorporating the law into the irreversibility budget constraint, the 
constraint of the whole society can reflect the two money flows, which 
                                                   
8 Cf. Miura [2015b] p.98. 
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compose the money circulation. We call such a constraint the irreversibility 
reflux budget constraint of the whole society. For the sake of brevity, we call 
it the whole budget constraint hereafter. This is an authentic monetary 
budget constraint of the whole society. 
  We aim to derive the whole budget constraint concretely. Since the 
irreversibility constraint of the first basic-term (X1+H1=Ψ) does not include 
revenue, the law of transfer equality cannot have an effect on it. Therefore, 
the whole budget constraint of the first basic-term is the same as its 
irreversibility budget constraint. On the other hand, the irreversibility 
constraint of the second basic-term includes revenue, thus the law has an 
effect on it.  
  As derived above, the budget of the second basic-term is equal to H1+Y1. 
Considering the law of transfer equality in the first basic-term (X1=Y1), the 
budget is equal to X1+H1. This is also equal to Ψ due to the constraint of the 
first basic-term. Hence, the budget of the second basic-term becomes Ψ. 
Substituting this for the constraint of the second basic-term, it can be 
rewritten as X2+H2=Ψ. This is the whole budget constraint of the second 
basic-term. 
  Therefore, the whole budget constraint of each basic-term can be denoted 
as Xt+Ht=Ψ. Since Ψ represents the money stock in the relevant space-time, 
we can see that the whole budget constraint is nothing but a constraint for 
expenditure by money stock. 
  This constraint is essentially the same as the cash-in-advance constraint 
applied to the whole society.9 However, it must be noted that it is not an 
axiom, but a theorem derived from the irreversibility budget constraint and 
the law of transfer equality. 
  Let us suppose that we use a budget constraint which permits time 
reversible disposal such as X1+H1=Ψ+Y1 or X2+H2=H1+Y2. If we substitute 
the law of transfer equality to these constraints, they become H1=Ψ or 
H2=H1. Accordingly, expenditure disappears from them. If expenditure 
disappears from the budget constraint, the agent can expend infinitely. This 
infinite expenditure qualitatively expresses that money circulates infinitely 
in a temporally closed place. Therefore, money stock cannot become a 
constraint for expenditure if money can be disposed time reversibly. A 
constraint by money stock is a product of time-irreversible disposal in a 
money circulation structure.10 
  In addition, from the term end settlement formula (Ω=H2+Y2) and the law 
                                                   
9 The cash-in-advance constraint was originally suggested by Karl Brunner, and was 
developed further by Mario Henrique Simonsen, Robert Wayne Clower and others. Cf. 
Brunner [1951] pp.167-171, Clower [1967], Boianovsky [2002]. 
10 This is an example that the disposal irreversibility principle can solve the second 
missing problem of the monetary budget constraint shown in Miura [2015b]. A simple 
explanation to understand this truth using an analogy is provided by Miura [2015c]. 
The discussion regarding the jinn particle in a physics context may promote the 
understanding of this issue. Cf. Lossev & Novikov [1992], Gott [2002] pp.20-24. 
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of transfer equality in the second basic-term (X2=Y2), we can derive Ω=H2+X2. 
Since X2+H2=Ψ holds by the whole budget constraint, Ω=Ψ is satisfied. This 
shows that the money stocks are equal at the beginning and the end of a 
relevant term. We call this the law of money conservation. 
  Thus, we can conclude Ψ=B1=B2=Ω holds. This conclusion indicates that 
the quantity of money stock in the relevant space-time is constant. It is a 
natural conclusion from the assumption that money is not produced, does not 
disappear, and is not transferred between the outside of the relevant society. 
  Expenditure and hoarding must be non-negative by their economic 
meaning, thus Xt≥0 and Ht≥0 hold. Considering these with the whole budget 
constraint, we can derive 0≤X1≤Ψ and 0≤X2≤Ψ. We sometimes indicate this 
as the whole budget constraint hereafter. 
  The whole budget constraint can be illustrated as the following graph. 
 
 
 
  Following this, the axis of expenditure in the first basic-term (X1) is taken 
to be horizontal, and the axis of expenditure in the second basic-term (X2) is 
taken to be vertical. A shaded area including boundary lines is the range of 
the whole budget constraint. X1=Ψ holds if hoarding is not executed in the 
first basic-term, and X2=Ψ holds if hoarding is not executed in the second 
basic-term. Therefore, money is not hoarded at all in Point A(Ψ, Ψ). We call 
this point the non-hoarding state. 
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3. Feasible Expenditure Set 
 
  The whole budget constraint is not a unique constraint for feasible 
expenditure. In order to explain another constraint, we first have to clarify 
why money is expended. 
  In reality, money is transferred for various reasons, but the main reason is 
for exchanging commodities. Further, consumption commodities are 
fundamental commodities. Our primitive economy assumes that money is 
transferred only for trading with consumption goods. This assumption can 
also be expressed so that the representative agent is an individual proprietor 
who sells only consumption goods. 
  Note that the method of saving is limited to hoarding in our primitive 
economy by this assumption. In reality, there exist other methods of saving 
including deposit, loan and equity investment. Since they are transferred 
from their owner to another agent while saving, we call them transfer saving 
collectively. Even though transfer saving has a large importance in a modern 
economy, it is not considered in a primary approach of this paper. 
  Moreover, we assume that traded consumption goods are of only one kind. 
Then, the price of a basic-term is defined as the expenditure of the 
basic-term per unit of consumption goods exchanged with the expenditure. 
Let Ct be a quantity of consumption goods and Pt be price level in Basic-term 
t. Due to the definition of price, Pt=Xt/Ct holds. 
  Then, we classify features of price change caused by change in expenditure. 
If the changing rate of price is less than that of the expenditure, we call that 
price as sticky. If the changing rate of price is equal to that of expenditure, 
we refer to that price as flexible. If the changing rate of price is more than 
that of expenditure, we call that price as hypersensitive. 
  Hoarding loss is a phenomenon which occurs in the case of price stickiness. 
In order to simplify the following explanation, we hereafter assume that 
price is fixed, which is defined as the price of a basic-term that never changes 
even if the expenditure of the same term changes. Price fixedness is a special 
case of price stickiness. There may be a possibility that the price of a 
basic-term is affected by expenditure in another basic-term, but we assume 
that such an effect does not exist to simplify the explanation. 
  Thus, we define the real commodity supply set as the combination of 
commodities in each basic-term, which can be supplied. Moreover, in order to 
enable comparison to nominal expenditure, we define a nominal commodity 
supply set as follows. A combination of expenditure (X1, X2) belongs to the 
nominal commodity supply set if and only if a combination of consumption 
goods (X1/P1, X2/P2) belongs to the real commodity supply set. The nominal 
commodity supply set represents the expenditure quantity, which is needed 
to purchase supplied commodities. 
  The nominal commodity supply set can be illustrated as follows. 
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  The shaded area including boundary lines is a range of the nominal 
commodity supply set. Although this set is illustrated in a convex shape, this 
shape was prepared only to easily distinguish it from the whole budget 
constraint. Note that we do not set any special suppositions regarding the 
shape of the nominal supply set. 
  Expenditure which does not belong to the nominal commodity supply set 
cannot be realized because commodities that ought to be exchanged with the 
expenditure are not supplied. Accordingly, the feasible expenditure of the 
whole society must belong to both the whole budget constraint and the 
nominal supply set. Based on this, we call the common part of the two a 
feasible expenditure set. The feasible expenditure set is illustrated as 
follows. 
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  A shaded area including boundary lines is a range of the feasible 
expenditure set. In this graph, Point A, which refers to the non-hoarding 
state, does not belong to the feasible expenditure set. This situation shows 
that money must be hoarded because commodities are sold out even given 
low expenditure. We call this undersupplied hoarding. 
  Considering Xt=PtCt holds, the nominal supply set becomes small if price 
becomes low. In this case, undersupplied hoarding occurs easily because 
commodities are easily sold out. 
  Even if undersupplied hoarding occurs, all supplied commodities can be 
consumed. Therefore, this is not a hoarding which brings an economic loss. 
We should pay attention that all types of hoarding do not cause a loss. 
  Hereafter, we assume that the whole budget constraint is included in the 
nominal supply set. It is a situation as the following figure shows. 
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  In this case, Point A is always included in the feasible expenditure set, 
thus the undersupplied hoarding does not occur. Further, the feasible 
expenditure set accords with the whole budget constraint. Hence, we identify 
the whole budget constraint with the feasible expenditure set hereafter. 
 
 
4. Social Optimal Solution 
 
We assume that the agent obtains utility from consumption goods in two 
basic-terms. By this assumption, the utility function is denoted as U[C1, C2]. 
Further, we assume that the utility is not satiated by consumption. That is, 
the more commodities are consumed in a basic-term, the more the utility 
increases, provided that the consumption does not vary the other conditions. 
Mathematically, this assumption is denoted as ∂U/∂Ct>0. 
  For the sake of convenience in our money circulation optimization, we 
transform the utility of real consumption into that of nominal expenditure. 
We call this transformed utility (U[X1, X2]) the nominal utility function. 
  We will clarify how the utility varies by a variation of expenditure. The 
following equation holds by the chain rule in the differential calculus. 
∂U/∂X1=(∂U/∂C1)(∂C1/∂X1)+(∂U/∂C2)(∂C2/∂X1), 
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  Since C1=X1/P1 holds by the definition of price, we can derive ∂C1/∂X1=1/P1 
under the supposition of price fixedness. Moreover, ∂C2/∂X1=0 holds because 
the price of a basic-term is assumed not to be affected by expenditure of 
another basic-term. Therefore, ∂U/∂X1=(∂U/∂C1)/P1 is satisfied. Note that 
∂U/∂C1>0 holds for the assumption of non-satiation and P1>0 also holds. 
Hence, ∂U/∂X1>0 is derived. Similarly, we obtain ∂U/∂X2>0. This conclusion 
represents that, the more money is expended in a basic-term, the more the 
utility increases, provided that the expenditure does not change the other 
conditions. We call this the monotonicity of the nominal utility function. 
  In addition, we introduce the following two suppositions for the nominal 
utility function. First, we suppose that a nominal marginal utility of the 
basic-term is not affected by expenditure of another basic-term. As a result, 
the marginal utility of a basic-term becomes a function of expenditure only in 
the same term. Based on this independency of nominal marginal utilities, we 
denote the marginal utility of Basic-term t as Ut[Xt]. Secondly, the nominal 
marginal utility is supposed to diminish as expenditure increases. 
  Since we assume that only a single agent exists, the utility function and 
the social welfare function are identified. Based on this, we define a social 
optimal solution as a state in which the utility is maximized within the range 
of the feasible expenditure set. We derive the optimal solution while 
considering that the feasible set agrees with the whole budget constraint. 
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  In this graph, curves falling downward to the right represent indifference 
curves, which are graphical expressions of the nominal utility function. By 
the monotonicity of the utility, if X1 increases, the utility also increases 
provided that X2 is constant. Similarly, if X2 increases, the utility also 
increases provided that X1 is constant. Therefore, the social optimal solution 
is both on X1=Ψ and X2=Ψ. That is, the solution is Point A, which is a 
non-hoarding state. We can see that the utility is objectively maximized if 
the agent does not hoard money at all in our primitive economy. 
  Assume a situation described as the following graph. 
 
 
 
  The social optimal solution is Point A, but it is not an optimal solution in 
the range that real commodities can be supplied. Point P is such an optimal 
solution where utility is maximized in the nominal supply set. This point is a 
social optimal solution if we ignore the constraint of money stock. We call it 
the pure social optimal solution. 
  In the case of the preceding graph, the feasibility of the pure social optimal 
solution is blocked by the existence of a money stock. Since this 
under-consumption occurs even if money is not hoarded at all, we call it a 
non-hoarding loss. 
  This economic loss occurs because the money stock is too low to execute the 
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expenditure needed to purchase all supplied commodities. Considering 
Xt=PtCt holds, the nominal supply set becomes large if price becomes high. 
Hence, the non-hoarding loss easily occurs where the fixed price is high. 
  However, under-consumption is not caused only by this reason. Even if the 
pure social optimal solution accords with the non-hoarding state, there is a 
possibility that the agent hoards money and an economic loss occurs. We will 
clarify the cause of this hoarding loss. 
 
 
5. Individual Optimal Solution 
 
In order to judge whether hoarding loss occurs or not, we have to examine 
expenditure optimization by an individual agent. For the purpose, we will 
clarify the budget constraint of an individual agent. 
Note that this paper supposes that there exists only a single agent in the 
relevant society. Therefore, some may think that the individual budget 
constraint ought to be the same as the whole budget constraint. This thought 
is appropriate if we regard this supposition as literally true. 
However, that supposition was introduced only for simplifying an 
explanation. It does not represent the truth in a monetary economy faithfully. 
Exchange does not occur if plural agents do not exist, and money cannot exist 
if exchange does not occur. Plurality of agents is essential for a monetary 
economy. Accordingly, an individual agent and the whole society must be 
distinguished to understand a monetary economy. Since this paper aims at a 
simple explanation, the distinction is expressed only by a difference in the 
budget constraint. The representative agent should not be interpreted as a 
literal expression of a single agent but should be interpreted as a collective 
expression of plural agents. We request readers to read the following 
description while recognizing this cautionary point. 
The individual agent shares the irreversibility budget constraint with the 
whole society. The irreversibility constraint is X1+H1=Ψ and X2+H2=H1+Y1. 
When we derived the whole budget constraint, we incorporated the law of 
transfer equality into the constraint. This law is a reflection that 
expenditure and revenue are the same events in the whole society. 
However, if an individual agent expends, their revenue is not guaranteed 
to increase. Inversely, even if the agent receives money, they do not need to 
expend it. Therefore, expenditure and revenue are two different events for an 
individual agent. As a result, an individual agent optimizes expenditure 
under the assumption that expenditure does not affect revenue.11 
We intend to eliminate hoarding from the constraint for a convenient 
                                                   
11 For an individual agent, expenditure can affect revenue by the expenditure reflux (Cf. 
Miura [2015a], [2015b]). However, based on the disposal irreversibility principle, 
expenditure affects only revenue of or after the second basic-term. In the framework of 
this paper, these revenue are not included in the budget, thus the expenditure reflux 
does not have an effect on individual decision-making. 
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explanation. H1 is included in both the budget constraints of the first 
basic-term and that of the second basic-term. We make one hoarding 
correspond to one constraint. If we aggregate the budget constraints of two 
basic-terms and arrange the aggregated formula, we can derive 
X1+X2+H2=Ψ+Y1. This formula can be regarded as the budget constraint of 
the entire relevant term. We can substitute this for the constraint of the 
second basic-term. As a result, the individual budget constraint becomes a 
set of the following equations. 
X1+H1=Ψ. 
X1+X2+H2=Ψ+Y1. 
  Thus, we have succeeded in making one hoarding correspond to one 
constraint. Then, we apply the non-negativity of hoarding (H1≥0 and H2≥0) to 
these equations. We can derive X1≤Ψ and X1+X2≤Ψ+Y1. We have thus 
succeeded in eliminating hoarding from the constraints. The individual 
budget constraint is a common part of these constraints and the 
non-negativity of expenditure (X1≥0 and X2≥0). It is illustrated as the 
following graph. 
 
 
 
  We should pay attention to difference of shapes between the whole budget 
constraint and the individual budget constraint. Whereas the former 
constraint is a square, the latter constraint is a trapezoid. This difference 
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reflects the effect of expenditure on revenue. 
  The shape of the individual budget constraint in simultaneous choice, 
which as usual economics shows, is a triangle. The reason why the constraint 
in our temporal choice does not shape into a triangle but shapes into a 
trapezoid is because time irreversible disposal was considered here. 
  The individual agent maximizes the nominal utility function under this 
constraint. By the monotonicity of the nominal utility, if X2 increases, the 
utility also increases provided that X1 is constant. As a result, the individual 
optimal solution satisfies X1+X2=Ψ+Y1. Therefore, the agent does not hoard 
money in the second basic-term. This is intuitively correct because hoarding 
in the last basic-term cannot be expended in the relevant term and is 
therefore ineffective. Hereafter, X1+X2=Ψ+Y1 is called the individual budget 
line. 
  Next, we will examine an individual optimal condition. We can classify the 
condition into two cases. 
  The first case is illustrated as follows. 
 
 
 
  In this case, the individual optimal solution is Point M(X1*, X2*), in which 
the slope of the tangent of an indifference curve and the slope of the budget 
line are equal. 
  Note that the following equation holds by the formula of the total 
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derivative. 
dU=U1[X1]dX1+U2[X2]dX2. 
Since the indifference curve represents a combination of expenditure in 
which utilities are equal, dU=0 is satisfied on the curve. Therefore, we can 
derive dX2/dX1=−U1[X1]/U2[X2] as a slope of the tangent of the indifference 
curve. On the other hand, the slope of the budget line (X1+X2=Ψ+Y1) is equal 
to −1. Accordingly, if we let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure which 
satisfies the individual optimal condition, X1*+X2*=Ψ+Y1 and 
−U1[X1*]/U2[X2*]=−1 have to hold. The latter condition can be rewritten as 
U1[X1*]=U2[X2*]. This condition is nothing but the law of equi-marginal 
utility, which was first stated by Hermann Heinrich Gossen.12 
  However, the law of equi-marginal utility is not a universal condition for 
maximizing utility. If we let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure whose 
marginal utilities are equalized, 0≤X1*≤Ψ must be satisfied to hold the law. 
Next, we examine the individual optimal condition in a case where X1*>Ψ 
holds. This second case is illustrated as follows. 
 
 
 
In this case, Point M(X1*, X2*), in which marginal utilities are equalized, is 
                                                   
12 Cf. Jolink & Van Daal [1998], Ikeda [2000], Meijer & Vogal [2000], Meijer [2000], 
Niehans [2008] regarding Gossen. 
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not an individual optimal solution because the money needed for the 
realization of X1* does not exist. A feasible budget line is X1+X2=Ψ+Y1 in the 
range of 0≤X1≤Ψ. An optimal solution of this case is Point M’(Ψ, Y1), which 
satisfies the feasible budget line and is the closest point to Point M. In this 
case, money is not hoarded in the first basic-term. 
  Additionally, there is a possibility that X1*<0. In this case, the 
X1-coordinate of the individual optimal solution becomes zero, but this paper 
does not consider this case. We assume that an individual optimal solution of 
expenditure is derived as a positive value. 
  Thus, we have succeeded in deriving the individual optimal solution 
provisionally. However, the solution has not been sufficiently clarified yet 
because it is not obvious how revenue is decided. Note that the above 
solution reflects only money flow from revenue to expenditure, which is 
expressed by the irreversibility budget constraint. It has not yet been shown 
where the expended money goes. A money circulation structure is never 
expressed entirely unless the money flow from expenditure to revenue is also 
considered. Revenue is decided by this whole expenditure reflux. This is the 
core idea of our money circulation optimization. We have to continue our 
examination to incorporate the effect of the whole expenditure reflux into the 
individual optimal solution. 
 
 
5. Time Preference Regarding Expenditure 
 
Whether an individual agent hoards money or not depends on the time 
preference type with respect to expenditure of the agent. We classify three 
preference types by comparing nominal marginal utilities of different 
basic-terms obtained from the same amount of expenditure. 
Let X be an expenditure level. 
If U1[X]>U2[X] is satisfied, past expenditure gives larger marginal utility 
than future expenditure at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is defined 
as the agent preferring past expenditure at an expenditure level X. 
If U1[X]<U2[X] is satisfied, future expenditure gives larger marginal utility 
than past expenditure at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is defined as 
the agent preferring future expenditure at an expenditure level X. 
If U1[X]=U2[X] is satisfied, past expenditure and future expenditure give 
the same marginal utility at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is defined 
as the agent preferring expenditure time neutrally at an expenditure level X. 
Then, we suppose a uniformity of time preference regarding expenditure 
level. This uniformity means that time preference does not depend on the 
expenditure level. If an agent in a basic-term prefers the past expenditure at 
an expenditure level, the agent also prefers the past expenditure in any 
another expenditure level. In the case that the agent prefers the future or 
time neutrality, the same relationship is supposed. Uniformity may not be an 
appropriate supposition in reality, but this paper supposes to simplify 
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analysis. 
We will explain the meaning of this uniformity using the following graphs, 
which express the relationship between expenditure (X) and the nominal 
marginal utility (MU). 
 
 
   
  In this graph, curves exist in a positive area of the nominal marginal 
utility. This reflects the monotonicity of the nominal utility. Further, curves 
fall downward to the right. This reflects the diminishment of the marginal 
utility. The curve of a basic-term does not intersect with the curve of another 
basic-term. This is a graphical representation of the uniformity of time 
preference. 
  In the preceding graph, the curve of the first basic-term is always located 
above the curve of the second basic-term. Hence, this is a graph that 
represents the case where the agent prefers past expenditure. Based on a 
supposition of the uniformity, an individual agent is called a past preference 
type if the agent prefers past expenditure. 
  Xt* expresses the expenditure of Basic-term t in the case where the 
nominal marginal utility is equal to MU*. Note that X1*>X2* holds. This 
feature is satisfied regardless of MU* level. This suggests that, if marginal 
utilities are equal, the past expenditure will always be larger than future 
expenditure. This is a feature of the past preference type. 
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Next, see the following graph. 
 
 
   
  In this graph, the curve of the first basic-term is always located below the 
curve of the second basic-term. This graph shows that the agent prefers 
future expenditure. Based on the supposition of uniformity, an individual 
agent is called a future preference type if the agent prefers future 
expenditure. 
  Note that X1*<X2* holds irrespective of the level of marginal utility MU*. 
This indicates that, if marginal utilities are equal, future expenditure is 
always larger than past expenditure. This is a feature of the future 
preference type. 
Moreover, see the following graph.  
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In the above graph, the curve of the first basic-term is overlaid with the 
curve of the second basic-term. This graph represents the case where the 
agent preference is time neutral. We earlier stated that the two curves do not 
intersect under the supposition of uniformity, but only this case is an 
exception. Based on the supposition of the uniformity, the individual agent is 
called a time neutral preference type if the agent prefers expenditure time 
neutrality. 
  Note that X1*=X2* holds even regardless of the level of nominal marginal 
utility MU*. This shows that, if marginal utilities are equal, the past 
expenditure and the future expenditure are always equal. This is a feature of 
the neutral preference type. 
We have thus obtained quantitative relationships between past and future 
expenditure where nominal marginal utilities are equal. We will illustrate 
these relationships with a graph of indifference curves. 
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  Let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure whose marginal utilities are 
equal. As confirmed in the preceding section, a slope of the tangent line of 
(X1*, X2*) is equal to −1. Further, this line passes through (X1*, X2*). Hence, 
it can be expressed as X2−X2*=−1(X1−X1*). This can be rewritten as X1+X2= 
X1*+X2*. The straight line downward to the right represents this line.  
  The straight line upward to the right represents the line representing the 
scenario where expenditures of two basic-terms are equal. Based on the 
above conclusion, if the agent is a time neutral preference type, the point 
(X1*, X2*) exists on the expenditure equal line. The middle curve represents 
an indifference curve of this type. If the agent is a past preference type, the 
point (X1*, X2*) exists on the right of the expenditure equal line. The most 
rightward curve represents an indifference curve of this type. If the agent is 
a future preference type, the point (X1*, X2*) exists on the left of the 
expenditure equal line. The most leftward curve represents an indifference 
curve of this type. 
 
 
6. Foundation of Hoarding Loss 
 
We have at length reached a stage where we can derive an individual 
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optimal solution considering money circulation. However, there is a further 
difficulty to obtain this derivation. We have to derive expenditure using the 
budget which includes revenue. Hence, revenue must be decided before 
expenditure is decided. On the other hand, revenue is decided by expenditure 
through the whole expenditure reflux. Accordingly, we fall into a circular 
argument such that expenditure must be decided before expenditure is 
decided. 
To overcome this difficulty, we adopt the following method. Note that our 
main concern is whether the non-hoarding state, which is a social optimal 
solution, is an individual optimal solution or not. We first attempt to judge it. 
We initially suppose that the agent forms an expenditure plan to not hoard 
money at all. Next, we derive revenue according to the initial expenditure 
plan and the law of transfer equality. Hereby, the budget is determined 
provisionally. The agent is supposed to optimize their expenditure under the 
provisional budget. As a result, a provisional solution of expenditure will be 
derived. 
An equivalent condition for the authentic individual optimal solution is 
that both of the expenditure optimization and the law of transfer equality 
hold consistently. If the provisional solution agrees with the initial 
expenditure plan, the optimal solution of expenditure to not hoard money at 
all is consistent with the law of transfer equality. Therefore, we can conclude 
that it is an authentic individual optimal solution. If the provisional solution 
does not agree with the initial expenditure plan, it is impossible that the 
non-hoarding state cannot satisfy both the expenditure optimization and the 
law of transfer equality. Hence, we can conclude that it is not an authentic 
individual optimal solution. 
Based on this policy, we initially suppose that the agent forms an 
expenditure plan such that (X1, X2)=(Ψ, Ψ). Due to this expenditure plan 
and the law of transfer equality, we can derive Y1=Ψ. Since Ψ+Y1=2Ψ is 
satisfied, the feasible individual budget line provisionally becomes 
X1+X2=2Ψ in the range of 0≤X1≤Ψ. We will derive an individual optimal 
solution under this constraint and examine it with the three time preference 
types. 
First, we examine where the agent is the time neutral preference type. As 
confirmed in Section 4, the individual optimal solution must satisfy the 
equality of marginal utilities unless expenditure of the first basic-term 
exceeds a quantity of the money stock. Let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of 
expenditure which satisfies the provisional budget line and whose marginal 
utilities are equal. Due to the latter condition, this point exists on the 
expenditure equal line in the case of the neutral preference type. Therefore, 
(X1*, X2*) lies on an intersection point of X1+X2=2Ψ and X1=X2. The 
intersection point becomes (X1*, X2*)=(Ψ, Ψ), which is the non-hoarding 
state. The following graph illustrates this. 
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  Note that the shaded area including boundary lines refers to the whole 
budget constraint. 
  Point A represents (Ψ, Ψ). Since X1*=Ψ holds, this point lies on the 
feasible budget line. Therefore, Point A qualifies as an individual optimal 
solution. This provisional solution accords with the initial expenditure plan. 
We can thus conclude that the non-hoarding state is an authentic individual 
solution in this case. 
  Hence, individual rational behavior achieves social optimality if the agent 
is the time neutral preference type. 
Next, we examine the case where the agent is the past preference type. Let 
(X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure which satisfies the provisional 
budget line (X1+X2=2Ψ) and whose marginal utilities are equal. As 
confirmed in Section 5, the latter condition requires that this point exists on 
the right side of the expenditure equal line (X1>X2) in the case of the past 
preference type. This scenario is illustrated in the following graph. 
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Point A represents (Ψ, Ψ), and Point B represents (X1*, X2*). Since 
X1*+X2*=2Ψ and X1*>X2* are satisfied, 2X1*>X1*+X2*=2Ψ holds. Hence, we 
can derive X1*>Ψ. This conclusion implies that Point B is not included 
within the feasible budget line. Therefore, Point B does not qualify as a 
feasible optimal solution even though marginal utilities are equalized at this 
point. The authentic solution is Point A, which satisfies the feasible budget 
line and is the closest to Point B. This provisional solution agrees with the 
initial expenditure plan. We can conclude that the non-hoarding state is an 
authentic individual optimal solution in this case. 
  Similar to case of the neutral preference type, individual rational behavior 
also achieves social optimality if the agent is the past preference type. 
Finally, we examine the case where the agent is the future preference type. 
Let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure which satisfies the provisional 
budget line (X1+X2=2Ψ) and whose marginal utilities are equal. As 
confirmed in Section 5, the latter condition requires that this point exists on 
the left side of the expenditure equal line (X1<X2) in the case of the future 
preference type. This scenario is illustrated in the following graph. 
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Point A represents (Ψ, Ψ), and Point B represents (X1*, X2*). Since 
X1*+X2*=2Ψ and X1*<X2* are satisfied, 2X1*<X1*+X2*=2Ψ holds. Hence, we 
can derive X1*<Ψ. This conclusion implies that Point B is included in the 
feasible budget line. Further, as the marginal utilities of this point are 
equalized, its utility is higher than the utilities of all other points which 
satisfy the feasible budget line. Therefore, Point B is an optimal solution 
under the provisional budget. However, this solution does not agree with the 
initial expenditure plan, which is equivalent to Point A. At this stage, we can 
conclude that the non-hoarding state is not an authentic individual optimal 
solution. 
Judging simply, Point B seems to the optimal solution. Then, how can the 
agent fulfill Point B? Let H1* be a hoarding quantity when the agent expends 
X1*. H1*=Ψ−X1* holds by the budget constraint of the first basic-term. Note 
that H1*>0 is satisfied because X1*<Ψ holds. From the definition of H1* and 
what (X1*, X2*) satisfies the individual budget line, we can derive 
X2*=2Ψ−X1*=Ψ+(Ψ−X1*)=Ψ+H1*. 
This calculation implies that the agent can change their expenditure plan 
from Point A to Point B by hoarding some money in the first basic-term and 
adding the hoarded money to expenditure of the second basic-term. That is, 
the agent can obtain higher utility by hoarding than by not hoarding at all. 
We can see that the agent hoards money if they behave rationally as 
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maximizing their utility. 
However, is Point B really an individual optimal solution? Since this point 
maximizes utility under the individual budget line, it seems to be qualified 
as the solution. Nevertheless, if it can be realized, a strange situation occurs. 
Since X2*=Ψ+H1* and H1*>0 hold, X2*>Ψ ought to be satisfied. This 
concludes that B(X1*, X2*) is not included within the whole budget constraint 
as illustrated in the preceding graph. This means that expenditure which 
exceeds money stock must be executed in a basic-term. How does the agent 
expend exceeding the money stock? Do they use the same money repeatedly? 
It is impossible to do so in a single basic-term if we recall the definition of 
basic-term. The whole budget constraint is a reflection of this impossibility. 
On the other hand, money is hoarded and sent to the second basic-term. As 
a result, the agent in the second basic-term can expend more money at Point 
B than at Point A, can’t they? If they can’t do so, where does the hoarded 
money disappear? It is unlikely that the hoarded money disappears. 
Then, what happens? We will clarify the answer. 
Point B is impossible. We should pay attention to the relationship between 
expenditure and revenue in the first basic-term. In Point B, X1*<Ψ holds as 
confirmed above. However, Y1=Ψ was assumed when the budget constraint 
was set. Therefore, expenditure and revenue are not the same quantity in 
the first basic-term. This contradicts the law of transfer equality, which is an 
objective law in a monetary economy. This is a definite reason why Point B 
cannot be realized. 
We ought to consider an effect of the law of transfer equality in the case 
where money is hoarded. When we derived Point B as an optimal solution, 
the agent optimized their utility under the budget line X1+X2=2Ψ. We should 
recall that the original budget line is X1+X2=Ψ+Y1. The former budget line is 
derived because we assume Y1=Ψ. However, when the agent decides to hoard 
H1*, expenditure of the first basic-term is decreased from Ψ to X1*. Due to 
the work of the law of transfer equality, this decrease of X1 causes a decrease 
of Y1, which changes from Ψ to X1*. Even though the hoarded money does 
not disappear, revenue is decreased instead. Accordingly, the budget is 
lowered from 2Ψ to Ψ+X1*. Based on the lowered budget line, the realized 
expenditure of the second basic-term is X2=Ψ when X1=X1* is satisfied. 
This situation can be illustrated as follows. 
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  Point C represents (X1*, Ψ), which is realized by hoarding H1*. In this 
graph, marginal utilities are equalized in Point C. Moreover, this point is 
derived as fulfilling the law of transfer equality. Since it satisfies conditions 
of individual optimality, it is an authentic individual optimal solution.13 
  As shown in the preceding graph, the utility of Point C is less than that of 
Point A, which refers to the non-hoarding state and the social optimal 
solution. The agent subjectively intends to change their expenditure plan 
from A to B by hoarding money, but they objectively change it from A to C 
because they maximize the utility while lowering the budget line. Although 
the agent hoards money to increase their utility, the hoarding actually 
decreases it against their intention. Thus, we can see that hoarding which is 
executed due to an individual’s rational judgment actually causes an 
economic loss. 
  It is not generally guaranteed that marginal utilities are equalized at 
Point C, which is located directly below Point B. If marginal utilities are not 
                                                   
13 Also note that Point C satisfies the whole budget constraint. This constraint is 
derived from the individual constraint and the law of transfer equality. Therefore, 
satisfying these two conditions is a sufficient condition for satisfying the whole 
constraint. Accordingly, Point C, which fulfills the two conditions, automatically 
satisfies the whole constraint. 
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equalized at Point C, the individual optimal solution lies elsewhere. But even 
if this were the case, the solution is not Point A, the non-hoarding state. 
 An individual optimal solution must satisfy the following three conditions, 
the law of equi-marginal utilities, the individual budget constraint, and the 
law of transfer equality. The first condition requires that X1<X2 in the case of 
the future preference type. Further, the second condition requires that 
X1+X2=Ψ+Y1, and the third condition requires that X1=Y1. Synthesizing 
these conditions, the individual optimal solution has to satisfy X1<Ψ and 
X2=Ψ. This solution is obviously not the non-hoarding state, and its utility is 
less than the non-hoarding state due to the monotonicity of the nominal 
utility function. Therefore, an individual optimal solution always gives a 
lower utility than the social optimal solution in the case where the agent is 
the future preference type. Thus, we can see that hoarding always brings an 
economic loss in this case. 
  This hoarding loss is directly connected with a decrease in nominal 
expenditure. Nevertheless, the decrease of nominal expenditure corresponds 
to that of real consumption under the fixed price. Hence, this is also a 
realization of under-consumption. 
 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
 
  The hoarding loss occurs based on a qualitative difference between the 
budget constraint of the whole society and that of the individual agent. We 
will show the two constraints again. 
[Whole Budget Constraint] 0≤X1≤Ψ, 0≤X2≤Ψ. 
[Individual Budget Constraint] 0≤X1≤Ψ, 0≤X2, X1+X2≤Ψ+Y1. 
Graphically, whereas the whole budget constraint is a square, the 
individual budget constraint is a trapezoid. This difference depends on 
whether the law of transfer equality is incorporated in the constraint 
beforehand or not. 
  In principle, the individual optimal solution must satisfy the law of 
equi-marginal utilities as traditional economics has taught us. However, this 
is only an optimal condition in the case where decision-making on 
expenditure does not vary the budget. 
But in the whole society, expended money refluxes as revenue. As a result, 
expenditure varies the budget. Since this whole expenditure reflux exists, 
equalizing marginal utilities is not an objective optimal condition. The law of 
transfer equality is a quantitative expression of this whole expenditure 
reflux. The whole budget constraint is indeed an objective constraint for 
expenditure because it incorporates this law. Hence, the non-hoarding state, 
which is a social optimal solution derived under the whole budget constraint, 
is an objectively correct optimal solution regardless of whether its marginal 
utilities are equal or not. 
  If the agent nevertheless hoards money to equalize marginal utilities, the 
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budget of the entire relevant term is forcibly lowered in order to satisfy the 
law of transfer equality. This is a reflection of the whole expenditure reflux 
working in the opposite direction. Since the agent makes a decision with 
ignoring the reflux, utility of the agent is decreased contrary to their 
intention.  
  The cause of the hoarding loss is decision-making without recognizing the 
law of transfer equality, which is an objective truth of a monetary economy. 
Why does the agent disregard the truth? 
  For an individual agent, expenditure refers to the money transferred from 
the agent to others, and revenue refers to the money transferred from others 
to the agent. Therefore, expenditure and revenue are surely separate events 
for an individual agent. Their decision-making under the idea that 
expenditure does not vary the budget is not based on an erroneous factual 
judgment. In this sense, the individual agent executes a rational judgment. 
  But in the whole society, expenditure and revenue are the same events 
namely money transfer. These two truths are not a contradiction because, 
even though expenditure of an individual agent does not vary their own 
revenue, it varies their others’ revenue. However, a selfish individual agent 
ignores this relational truth because their interest is limited to their private 
range and they form an expenditure plan without considering its impact on 
their others’ revenue. As a result, individual constraint detaches from the 
whole budget constraint, and the agent falls into an irrational situation 
despite their rational judgment. 
  This paper proved this irrationality of rationality under an assumption 
that the number of economic agents is limited to one and that of basic-terms 
is limited to two. But in the intended paper, we will assume that the 
numbers of agents and basic-terms are generalized. Then, we will prove that 
hoarding behavior by individual rational judgment brings a Pareto 
inefficient situation. 
  This proof will assume that agents similarly prefer future expenditure as 
in this paper. However, the author already knows that hoarding loss can 
occur even if agents prefer past expenditure or time neutrality. Since this 
hoarding loss depends on a distribution, it cannot be explained using the 
representative agent model like this paper. The author also intends to 
publish a paper, which discusses this distributive hoarding loss in the near 
future. 
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